"Going to Tehran" - update on my views of the book

People have been emailing me recently about my review of the Leveretts' new book, "Going to Tehran", which I mentioned in an earlier post. I thought it was a great book then, and still do so, even though people have complained about a variety of issues, for example the suggestion that Iran had an active role in the US Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon. I consider these to be a matter of dispute over emphasis rather than factual accuracy. In any case, disputes over these minor issues do not really distract from the main point of their argument in favor of a "Nixon goes to China" resolution to the current US-Iran standoff. 

However, I do have a complaint that does related to their broader argument. Nixon's decision to recognize China, in retrospect of course, was inevitable. It was simply a logical move in any 3-person game: the two who can most quickly combine against the remaining one, win a temporary advantage. It is a matter of creating an "odd man out". In the case of the US and China, Nixon's move was within the context of a conflict with the Soviets, which served as its motive. With one fell swoop, Nixon brought one-quarter of humanity closer to the US, and farther away from the Soviets. But even though it was such an obvious and logical move, it was also quite brilliant the way Nixon simply decided to turn the ship of state on a dime, and dismantle almost overnight an entire aparatus of policy and substitute an entirely new and contrary one in its stead.

But in the case of the US-Iran standoff, there is no third party to play a role comparable to the Soviets. It IS a three-party game -- the US, Iran, and Israel -- but the relations between the parties are different. In Nixon's days, the Soviets and Chinese were in a basically antagonistic relationship, which created a wedge that Nixon exploited to make the Soviets the odd man out. Today, the Israelies and the US are in a cooperative (if not co-opted) relationship, and Iran is the odd-man out. 

So, under such conditions, how realistic is the argument in favor of a "Nixon going to China" approach when it comes to Iran? Not very, I'm afraid. So while I agree with the argument posited by the Leveretts regarding a policy choice that would benefit the US in the long run, I don't see the sufficient commitment nor the willingness to take political risk that would be required for such a gambit to ever actually occur.

Comments

[Richard Steven Hack]

I have to agree that whether there is an "enemy" one can convert to an "ally" is mostly irrelevant to the Iran conflict.

In fact, the opposite is true. We need to dump Israel as an "ally" - because they are actually our (and everyone else's) enemy - and re-align with Iran.

[nima]

The Leveretts are such apologists for the regime, that it's almost sad.

Let's not forget these are the same people who think the Iranian regime has the support of the masses and that women's conditions have improved since 1979.

Oh yeah, and their "tour guide" is Prof. Mirandi....another well-known spokesperson for the regime.

[PB]

I agree with Cyrus.

But the question remains, what is Iran to do? What would bring this matter to peaceful resolution and off the war tracks?

Those are the questions that must be answered.

[aletho]

The obvious parallel would be for the US to make Russia the odd man out through US - Iranian rapprochement.

Russia is the big military and territorial impediment to long term US global dominance. China is still on side. Japan and Germany are occupied.

But then there is the Zionist imperative. That wasn't a factor for Nixon in China.

[Pirouz]

Cyrus, you need to read more into Going to Tehran than you have. The object of the Leveret's policy advocacy is a realignment beyond the three power condition you've identified, with the US and Israel on one side, and initiate a realignment with the IRI.

They did provide additional motivations for Nixon/Kissinger's realignment with China that went beyond the Cold War.

You can remain skeptical this can be pulled off with Iran, but consider Going to Iran as having the similar effect on public discussion as Mearsheimer and Walt's The Israel Lobby.