Most people are getting their (limited) understanding of the facts about Iran's nuclear program, and the legalities of the what the Non-proliferation Treaty actually requires of Iran, from screaming headlines attached to highly biased articles that have been appearing in mainstream media. I recommend that you actually buy a book or two to learn what's going on instead of having your opinions made for you:
Beyond Arms Control: Challenges and Choices for Nuclear Disarmament
by Michael Veiluva
The Iranian note to the IAEA of 24 March 2008 is perhaps Iran’s most comprehensive statement of the legal and political justification for its continuing resistance to the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions demanding cessation of its uranium enrichment programme. The central postulate of Iran’s March 2008 note is the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy guaranteed by NPT Article IV, and the violation of that article by the US-brokered sanctions.
This point, standing alone, begs the question of whether Iran has met the conditions for exercise of this right under Articles II and III [of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.] These conditions would include:
• To not accept any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article II);
• To not seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article II);
• To enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA over all of its fissionable nuclear materials (Article III);
• To not divert any fi ssionable nuclear material subject to Article III;
• To follow all procedures provided in the safeguards agreement with respect to such agreements, including verifi cation (Article III).
As of September 2009, the IAEA had never determined that Iran had violated any of these conditions. But since the United States and the E3 continue to insist that “unanswered questions” remain, particularly as to the acquisition of weapons information (via the “laptop of death” and other miscellany), the IAEA has likewise refrained from giving Iran any statement that it has completed the modalities required under the IAEA’s 2007 workplan. The IAEA remains unwilling to declare the nuclear issues closed, the consequence of enormous pressure from the West and Iran’s prickly history of responsiveness. Iran otherwise correctly points out that the United States opposed the 2007 workplan when it was announced. Iran’s formal letter also correctly identifi es the confl ict between US demands that it cease uranium enrichment on one hand and the IAEA’s mandate to verify the non-diversion of fi ssionable material on the other. Since 2007, the IAEA agreed that it had no evidence of any such diversion. However, once the IAEA inserted commentary to both reports citing transparency issues and lack of forthrightness on Iran’s part, the door was open to the United States and its allies to impose the negative burden of proof upon Iran to establish an impeccable and possibly impossible performance history…
The current impasse between Iran and the United States over uranium enrichment actually has little to do with the IAEA safeguards agreements or the shortcomings in reporting and verification by Iran to date. Rather, the conflict is over Iran’s refusal to abide by a political sanction selected by a few powerful states and endorsed by the UN Security Council, namely a demand to suspend uranium enrichment, an activity that many nations engage in and which is encouraged by NPT Article IV. To suspend this programme remains a non-negotiable issue for Iran.