I thought I'd add this article to my previous posts about uranium enrichment in Iran and nuclear energy for Iran:
It is often claimed that since Iran doen't yet have an operational reactor that uses enriched uranium (though it has plans to build such reactors) and the reactor at Bushehr is to be powered by fuel from Russia for the next few years, and Iran could import enriched uranium more cheaply than make it at home, then obvioulsy Iran's development of uranium enrichment technology must be intended for nefarious purposes, ie: to make nuclear weapons.
However, this is total bullshit. For one thing, Iran has yet to really develop its nuclear fuel enrichment program. The enrichment program at Natanz is no where near done. The facility is intended to house 50,000 centrifuges -- and right now only 5000 or so are installed and not all of them are working at full capacity. At current the rate of progress, the full 50,000 centrifuges won't be installed and operational for at least another 10 years or so. So, the argument that Iran's development of an enrichment program must be intended to make nukes since it has no reactors, is based on a false premise.
Secondly, many countries have developed uranium enrichment technology even though they have no reactors at all that use enriched uranium as a fuel source. As the Arms Control Association has noted:
Lack of strong nuclear expansion, however, has not stopped several countries from expressing interest in developing enrichment capabilities, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. None of these countries has a domestic reactor base that would require developing enrichment capability. Instead, they may be interested in enrichment to keep their future options open and for export purposes. Brazil, which is commissioning a new centrifuge enrichment plant at Resende, will likely produce more low-enriched uranium than is needed for its consumption by 2015. If such decisions were made purely on economic grounds, the thresholds for achieving economies of scale are high but not insurmountable. One estimate is that indigenous centrifuge enrichment becomes cost effective at the capacity level of 1.5 million separative work units, an amount required by 10 1-gigawatt plants. Even then, such an enrichment plant is unlikely to be competitive with larger suppliers such as Urenco.
And why are countries pursuing enrichment even though they may not really need it right now? Because...
Almost all the new and prospective entrants in the enrichment business appear anxious to establish their credentials as having existing technology in place.
Driving this process, in part, is the perception that all countries will soon be divided into uranium enrichment "haves" (suppliers) and "have-nots" (customers) under various proposals to establish multinational nuclear fuel centers and fuel-supply arrangements.
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