It is often said that Iran "hid" its enrichment program until it was "exposed" in August 2002. I have written that the program was not really a secret at all, that it was publicly announced on national radio decades earlier, and that the Iranians had for example informed the IAEA in 1996 of plans to continue building a uranium conversion plant that the Chinese had abandoned (conversion is the first step in uranium enrichment.)
I have also mentioned an article written by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel which exposed how the IAEA itself had planned to provide technical assistance to Iran in developing enrichment capabilities, but that the US inteferred and prevented that in 1983 -- decades before the "revelation" of Iran's nuclear program in Aug 2002.
Here is the partial text of the Hibbs article (the "UF6" mentioned in the article title refers to uranium hexaflouride, which is ultimately used as nuclear fuel for reactors as UO2.)
U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6
Nuclear Fuel August 4, 2003by Mark Hibbs, Bonn
August 4, 2003
Vol. 28, No. 16; Pg. 12
Four years after the Islamic revolution, and two years after Iran's new leaders dusted off the nuclear program of the deposed Reza Shah Pahlevi, IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in reactivating a research program to learn how to process U3O8 into UO2 pellets and then set up a pilot plant to produce UF6, according to IAEA documents obtained by NuclearFuel.
Sources said that when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA's technical cooperation program, the U.S. government then ''directly intervened'' to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6. ''We stopped that in its tracks,'' said a former U.S. official.
Iran, which until the revolution had relied on uranium processing know-how from France, then went ahead on its own and set up fuel cycle-related cooperation programs with other countries. Beginning in 1991, the U.S. intervened with Argentine President Carlos Menem to prevent Invap from selling UO2 conversion technology to Iran (Nucleonics Week, 24 Sept.'92, 2). In 1997, the U.S. also persuaded China not to build a UF6 plant in Iran (NF, 3 Nov.'97, 3).
However, well-placed sources said last week, Beijing sold Iran the blueprints for the Chinese UF6 plant, and these were the basis for a UF6 production complex now under construction at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (Entec). When finished, this facility will supply feedstock for Iran's centrifuge enrichment plants at Natanz.
Entec was founded by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974. Its work was halted by the 1979 Islamic revolution, but in 1981 the new government concluded that the country's nuclear development should continue. In 1983, the AEOI then invited the IAEA to survey Entec and another installation, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.
Herman Vera Ruiz, an IAEA official tasked by Deputy Director General Maurizio Zifferero to conduct a mission to Iran, visited Entec in October 1983. In November, he recommended to Zifferero and to Director General Hans Blix that the IAEA provide assistance to move Iran's nuclear research program forward....
After the IAEA mission to Iran, the Vienna agency was ready to help Iran move that program along. The summary of the report states that ''a timely cooperation of the IAEA (with Entec) is highly recommendable'' to overcome ''a lack of practical experience and perhaps... a lack of contact with other scientists in more advanced institutes.'' Ruiz wrote that ''Though the overall objectives of Entec are quite clear and comprehensive, the short and medium term goals are undergoing revision to adjust them to a more realistic approach following the (Iranian) government's instructions.'' ...
Ruiz proposed that the IAEA provide assistance ''in the form of short expert missions as well as by granting fellowships... The director of Entec has repeatedly emphasized the severe difficulties they have encountered in the recent past to find appropriate training centers abroad where to train their scientists. Here again the cooperation of the Agency would be most welcome.''
...
The IAEA also was informed about Entec's largest department, for materials testing, which was responsible for fuel fabrication. ''Currently experimental work is being carried out on UO2 pellet fabrication (sintering and grinding), cladding welding, and quality control,'' the memo stated. According to sources, France had provided the basic know-how upon which the UO2 program was then based. When Iran's nuclear program was restarted, this department had 23 scientists, specialized in physical chemistry, metallurgy, and other fields. Ruiz described its laboratory equipment as ''impressive,'' and containing much equipment for materials testing.
Entec also set up a chemistry department. ''Its main duty is to perform experiments for the conversion of (U3O8) to nuclear grade UO2. As a future step, it is intended to increase the capacity to a pilot plant scale to process about 30 kilograms of uranium equivalent per day,'' Entec officials told the IAEA. The department had two subdivisions for uranium chemistry and analytical chemistry with a total of 20 scientists.
The memo included a list of proposed ''expert services'' which the IAEA would perform in eight fields relevant to work going on at all of Entec's departments. For fuel cycle programs, these were to be carried out in the French language, since most of Entec's relevant personnel were previously trained by French experts. The proposed items included assistance and training in UO2 pellet and fuel element production and quality control procedures, ''advice on the chemical engineering and design aspects of a pilot plant for fuel conversion,'' and ''advice on flow-sheet diagrams for uranium purification and conversion.'' Separately, after the IAEA mission, the agency proposed setting up 10 fellowships of between three and six months each, covering areas including chemical aspects of reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilot plants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear grade UO2.
While some of the proposals quickly found approval by the IAEA's technical cooperation department, the former U.S. official said that after the U.S. objected in Vienna, the IAEA dropped plans to help Iran on fuel production and uranium conversion.
Instead, sources said, within five years Iran had set up a bilateral cooperation on fuel cycle related issues with China. That resulted in a deal to have China sell Iran a UF6 conversion plant to be set up at Entec. In 1997, however, China agreed to U.S. arguments to drop most outstanding nuclear commerce with Iran, including the construction of the UF6 plant.
At that time, sources reported that regardless of the agreement by China not to build the UF6 plant at Entec, AEOI reiterated to the IAEA that Iran would go ahead with construction of the facility (NF, 30 Dec.'96, 1).
Sources said last week that while the U.S. has remained satisfied that China has held to its agreement not to build the plant in Iran, China sold all the blueprints to AEOI needed for the facility, allowing Iran to set up the conversion plant on its own. The plant was built at Entec beginning in 1997, and in 2000, Iran declared it to the IAEA. ...
Well, so much for a "hidden" and "secret" nuclear program in Iran!
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