Iran Affairs

OFAC rules on Iranian bank accounts

On July 23rd, the US Office of Foreign Asset Control issued a revision of the rules regarding people in Iran who had US bank accounts. Peviously, people (or their spouses) who were simply visiting Iran had their US bank accounts closed pursuant to these regulations. Apparently, the new regulations are intended to make things more lenient by revising the definition of "Iranian Accounts" so that it only applies to people who are "ordinarily resident" in Iran rather than people who happen to be simply "located" there:

"OFAC is revising § 560.320 to clarify the definition by substituting the new phrase ‘persons who are ordinarily resident in Iran, except when such persons are not located in Iran’ for the phrase ‘persons located in Iran.’ "

The full text of the new rule is in the Federal Register, Volume 74, Number 140 (July 23, 2009)

Iran's nuclear program was NOT a secret

It is often said that Iran "hid" its enrichment program until it was "exposed" in August 2002. I have written that the program was not really a secret at all, that it was publicly announced on national radio decades earlier, and that the Iranians had for example informed the IAEA in 1996 of plans to continue building a uranium conversion plant that the Chinese had abandoned (conversion is the first step in uranium enrichment.)

I have also mentioned an article written by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel which exposed how the IAEA itself had planned to provide technical assistance to Iran in developing enrichment capabilities, but that the US inteferred and prevented that in 1983 -- decades before the "revelation" of Iran's nuclear program in Aug 2002.

Here is the partial text of the Hibbs article (the "UF6" mentioned in the article title refers to uranium hexaflouride, which is ultimately used as nuclear fuel for reactors as UO2.)

U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6
Nuclear Fuel August 4, 2003

by Mark Hibbs, Bonn

Nuclear Fuel

August 4, 2003

Vol. 28, No. 16; Pg. 12

Four years after the Islamic revolution, and two years after Iran's new leaders dusted off the nuclear program of the deposed Reza Shah Pahlevi, IAEA officials were keen to assist Iran in reactivating a research program to learn how to process U₃O₈ into UO2 pellets and then set up a pilot plant to produce UF6, according to IAEA documents obtained by NuclearFuel.

Sources said that when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA's technical cooperation program, the U.S. government then ''directly intervened'' to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6. ''We stopped that in its tracks,'' said a former U.S. official.

Iran, which until the revolution had relied on uranium processing know-how from France, then went ahead on its own and set up fuel cycle-related cooperation programs with other countries. Beginning in 1991, the U.S. intervened with Argentine President Carlos Menem to prevent Invap from selling UO2 conversion technology to Iran (Nucleonics Week, 24 Sept.'92, 2). In 1997, the U.S. also persuaded China not to build a UF6 plant in Iran (NF, 3 Nov.'97, 3).

However, well-placed sources said last week, Beijing sold Iran the blueprints for the Chinese UF6 plant, and these were the basis for a UF6 production complex now under construction at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (Entec). When finished, this facility will supply feedstock for Iran's centrifuge enrichment plants at Natanz.

Entec was founded by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974. Its work was halted by the 1979 Islamic revolution, but in 1981 the new government concluded that the country's nuclear development should continue. In 1983, the AEOI then invited the IAEA to survey Entec and another installation, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.

Herman Vera Ruiz, an IAEA official tasked by Deputy Director General Maurizio Zifferero to conduct a mission to Iran, visited Entec in October 1983. In November, he recommended to Zifferero and to Director General Hans Blix that the IAEA provide assistance to move Iran's nuclear research program forward....

After the IAEA mission to Iran, the Vienna agency was ready to help Iran move that program along. The summary of the report states that ''a timely cooperation of the IAEA (with Entec) is highly recommendable'' to overcome ''a lack of practical experience and perhaps... a lack of contact with other scientists in more advanced institutes.'' Ruiz wrote that ''Though the overall objectives of Entec are quite clear and comprehensive, the short and medium term goals are undergoing revision to adjust them to a more realistic approach following the (Iranian) government's instructions.'' ...

Ruiz proposed that the IAEA provide assistance ''in the form of short expert missions as well as by granting fellowships... The director of Entec has repeatedly emphasized the severe difficulties they have encountered in the recent past to find appropriate training centers abroad where to train their scientists. Here again the cooperation of the Agency would be most welcome.''

...

The IAEA also was informed about Entec's largest department, for materials testing, which was responsible for fuel fabrication. ''Currently experimental work is being carried out on UO2 pellet fabrication (sintering and grinding), cladding welding, and quality control,'' the memo stated. According to sources, France had provided the basic know-how upon which the UO2 program was then based. When Iran's nuclear program was restarted, this department had 23 scientists, specialized in physical chemistry, metallurgy, and other fields. Ruiz described its laboratory equipment as ''impressive,'' and containing much equipment for materials testing.

Entec also set up a chemistry department. ''Its main duty is to perform experiments for the conversion of (U3O8) to nuclear grade UO2. As a future step, it is intended to increase the capacity to a pilot plant scale to process about 30 kilograms of uranium equivalent per day,'' Entec officials told the IAEA. The department had two subdivisions for uranium chemistry and analytical chemistry with a total of 20 scientists.

The memo included a list of proposed ''expert services'' which the IAEA would perform in eight fields relevant to work going on at all of Entec's departments. For fuel cycle programs, these were to be carried out in the French language, since most of Entec's relevant personnel were previously trained by French experts. The proposed items included assistance and training in UO2 pellet and fuel element production and quality control procedures, ''advice on the chemical engineering and design aspects of a pilot plant for fuel conversion,'' and ''advice on flow-sheet diagrams for uranium purification and conversion.'' Separately, after the IAEA mission, the agency proposed setting up 10 fellowships of between three and six months each, covering areas including chemical aspects of reactor fuel fabrication, chemical engineering and design aspects of pilot plants for uranium conversion, corrosion of nuclear materials, LWR fuel fabrication, and pilot plant development for production of nuclear grade UO2.

While some of the proposals quickly found approval by the IAEA's technical cooperation department, the former U.S. official said that after the U.S. objected in Vienna, the IAEA dropped plans to help Iran on fuel production and uranium conversion.

Instead, sources said, within five years Iran had set up a bilateral cooperation on fuel cycle related issues with China. That resulted in a deal to have China sell Iran a UF6 conversion plant to be set up at Entec. In 1997, however, China agreed to U.S. arguments to drop most outstanding nuclear commerce with Iran, including the construction of the UF6 plant.

At that time, sources reported that regardless of the agreement by China not to build the UF6 plant at Entec, AEOI reiterated to the IAEA that Iran would go ahead with construction of the facility (NF, 30 Dec.'96, 1).

Sources said last week that while the U.S. has remained satisfied that China has held to its agreement not to build the plant in Iran, China sold all the blueprints to AEOI needed for the facility, allowing Iran to set up the conversion plant on its own. The plant was built at Entec beginning in 1997, and in 2000, Iran declared it to the IAEA. ...

Well, so much for a "hidden" and "secret" nuclear program in Iran!

 

US agency mistranslated Iran election report

CJ Harwood a.k.a. Warlaw compares the BBC Monitoring's translation of the of the Guardian Council report on election irregularities in Iran with the U.S. Open Source Center's translation, and finds a major discrepancy:

The U.S. OSC file silently omits text, the smoking gun, the number of accredited election observers, ID cards, issued to 40,676 observers requested by Mir Hossein Mousavi (Mirhoseyn Musavi) and issued to 13,506 observers requested by Mehdi Karroubi (Mehdi Karrubi), Mousavi’s ally. ...

Warlaw concludes from this:

The signatures of these, their own observers, on the ballot count forms on the day, and their subsequent silence, and the silence of Musavi and Karrubi on their behalf, their failure to challenge any of the published ballot box counts, constitutes their certification, that every single ballot box count they observed, the published ballot count is accurate, that’s at least 89% of the 45,692 total ballot boxes. And maybe all of them, some polling stations had more than one ballot box and so some observers presumably certified more than one box.

More here

And the original, Farsi-language version of the Guardian Council report is here and see this Gozaresh too

Unfolded ballots nonsense

For those of you who have written to ask me about the whole "unfolded ballots" nonsense  as "evidence" of fraud in the Iranian elections, I just want to say do a LITTLE BIT of research on your own before you believe things so easily. For example check out Jeremy Hammond's expose here.

Take the first claim, that the ballots are unfolded. The implication is that the Guardian Council  simply fabricated these ballots for the purpose of the recount. The election was only three weeks ago. There would be no reason for the paper not to be “fresh” and “crisp” after three weeks of sitting in a box. But the ballots do appear to be unfolded. But as we’ve also seen, the slot in the ballot box is perfectly big enough to accommodate an unfolded ballot. It could equally well be that these ballots simply were not folded by the individuals who cast them.

In the second image, again, it appears there are no folds in the ballots. It’s possible it’s just difficult to see because of the ribbon tied around the center of each, which would likely be where the fold is if people folded their ballot in half. If there indeed are no folds, it may just be people didn’t fold them. They didn’t “have to” as claimed by The Lede and Pitney’s anonymous writer.

But look again at the third photo, which both say show unfolded ballots. The first thing to observe is that these ballots are rolled up. So even if they were folded, it would be difficult to see the folds. The second thing to observe is that some of the ballots clearly were folded.

And then use your brains. Do you REALLY think that a single person (all the ballots supposed had the "same handwriting") sat down an falsified millions of ballots, and distributed them in thousands of vote counting stations across the large country (Iran is the 18th largest nation on Earth) as a way to cheat? T

he very claim itself is laughable because the people who insist that there was voting fraud also claim that the fraud occurred not when the ballots were counted, but when the Interior Ministry simply decided to substitute their own numbers for the supposedly "real" ones (they even produced a supposed secret letter to Khameini from the Interior Ministry to "verify" this allegation) -- so there would be no need to falsify ballots according to this theory of election fraud in Iran.

FOr god's sake at lease stick to one conspiracy theory instead of contradictory ones. In the meantime see more photos of the ballot counting here.

Clinton: Iran does not have right to nuclear enrichment

Well, I guess Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has finally showed the face of the US in its nuclear standoff with Iran, when she blatantly claimed that Iran does not have the right to enrichment. According to the NY Times, she specifically said:

You do not have the right to obtain nuclear weapons. You do not have the right to full enrichment and reprocessing cycle under your control. But there's a lot that we can do with Iran if Iran accepts what is the international consensus. 

So we're clear now: the US is specifically trying to deprive Iran of a right that other nations have.

As to the issue of nuclear weapons: Iran does have the right to produce nuclear weapons if it wanted to. Under the NPT agreement, all Iran (and other non-nuclear weapons states) did was to suspend that right, and agree not to exercise it -- in exchange for certain promises from the nuclear-armed states (such as the US, which has violated every one of its NPT obligations.) However, under the terms of the same treaty (specifically, Article X) signatories are able to withdraw from the treaty if they deem it in their national interests to do so -- and having done so, they are fully entitled to make as many nukes as they want. After all, there's no law of nature that says that the US has the right to make nukes but no one else. However, Iran has specifically stated that it has no intention of withdrawing from the treaty, as much as Bolton would have liked Iran to do.

As for the right to enrichment and reprocessing: Too bad the NY Times didn't bother asking: Why doesn't Iran have a right to do those things? Why does the US have that right, but not IRan? What about Japan, Argentina, and Brazil? Is Iran any less of of a sovereign nation, Hillary?

And finally, as to the claimed "international consensus" - actually, the international consensus favors Iran. As I have written previously, developing nations have consistently stated (since even before the controversy with Iran) that they will not give up the right to enrichment.

So we're clear now -- the US objections to Iran's nuclear program has nothing to do with weapons, but is intended to deprive Iran of the technology of nuclear fuel production, even if conducted fully within the scope and confines of the NPT, as Iran has been doing. 

As I have written many times previously, this whole conflict over Iran is not really about "Iranian nuclear weapons" but is a broader conflict between the developed and developing nations over the control of the sole source of energy in the near future. According to a 2004 analysis by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies:

"Many NPT state parties, particularly those from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), have already stated their opposition to President Bush’s proposals to restrict enrichment. In their view, precluding states from developing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities contradicts an important tenet of the NPT-that is, the deal made by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).  Article IV of the NPT states that NNWS have the inalienable right to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a right intended to provide an incentive for NNWS to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Bush proposals, however, introduce another element into the nonproliferation regime by segmenting countries into those that can engage in enrichment and reprocessing and those that cannot. Since most states with fuel cycle capabilities are from the developed world, it is clear that the target group of the proposal is the developing world."

Guardian Council report on Iran's presidential election

For the sake of historical accuracy, I have attached the full text of the detailed report of the Guardian Council on Iran's 2009 presidential election.

The report addresses many of the claims made about how the elections were supposedly fraudulent (magic pens with disappearing ink used by voters, for example)

For example the report explains the presence of more than 100 per cent of those eligible to vote in certain constituencies. The Guardian Council report clearly states that it was not an "irregularity" but was in fact a normal occurance, because the number of eligible voters was based on the location where voters' birth certificates were issued, but people in Iran are not required to vote in the cities where they were born and are free to vote in other locations. 

Following the meeting with the heads of the country's registrar office and the country's office of national statistics, it was revealed that the criteria for announcing the number of participants in the election in certain electoral areas was the census last taken in 2006 and in other areas the number of participants have been based on the ninth presidential election. Furthermore, according to the officers in the registrar office, the criteria of this organization for announcing the statistics  is the number of birth certificates issued in a certain area. Clearly the number of birth certificates in an area has nothing to do with the presence of people in the same area at the time of elections, because people are free to choose to live in any areas…

 

The history of the issue: In confirming points made above it is enough to pay attention to the number of voters in the previous election to prove that this point is natural and logical. As a recent example, we refer to the statistics of the ninth presidential election. In many areas the number of voters was significantly higher than the number of eligible voters in that area. For instance, in Shemiranat 800 per cent of population voted i.e. eight times more than the total number of the eligible voters in this area. Due to the reasons mentioned above, this is quite normal and inevitable. Based on the points raised above it becomes clear to any sane mind that this issue cannot be taken as an election violation and be used as an excuse to question the proud participation of people of Iran in the election. Of course, it is a shame that these ambiguities are spread across the society by those who have themselves been occasionally behind holding elections in the country and are aware of these issues very well. In fact, similar issues have occurred during their own term in office.

Mark Fitzpatrick interview with CFR on Iran's nuclear program

Mark Fitzpatrick repeates a bunch of baloney about Iran's nuclear program in an interview with Bernard Gwertzman of the CFR. I thought it would be fun to some of take it apart, since I don't have time to pay attention to the whole thing.

First, I'll deal with the last point raised. Mark Fitzpatrick claims that:

There are various reasons why it's illogical for Iran to insist on having an enrichment program for the purposes of making fuel for a nuclear power program. One is that its insistence on self-sufficiency will be impossible to realize anyway because it doesn't have sufficient uranium ore to provide the basis for the nuclear power program it envisions of ten to twenty nuclear reactors. It has enough uranium ore for one reactor, or for a nuclear weapons program, but not for the nuclear power program it envisions.

But Fitzpatric knows better. Salehi, the current head of the Iran's atomic energy program and former representative to the IAEA explained this clearly in his interview with the Financial Times in 2004: Iran doesn't intend to power all of its future reactors with domestic uranium. Rather, it is developing an enrichment program in order to have better leverage in negotiations over price. As Salehi explained:

Natanz has been designed to produce 30 tons of enriched uranium up to 5 per cent maximum [ - below the level required for a nuclear bomb], and that is only enough for one year’s refuelling. Nantaz, with all its vastness, can supply only one reactor for a year. We are to construct seven reactors, we are starting the bid for the twin reactor in Bushehr in a year’s time, so for that one we need to buy our uranium from outside.
...We say that for other plants we are going to buy our fuel from outside, but we are not going to become hostage to their wishes. Once they know we can develop our own enrichment, then they will enter into bargaining with us – like any other country.

Fitzpatrick also claims that it was Iran that has refused to enter into negotiations over its nuclear program, over an offer to limit Iran's enrichment program:

It's been on the table for over a year now and Iran hasn't responded to it. That offer can't be there forever. Meanwhile, Iran keeps ramping up its number of centrifuges.

But El Baradei, the head of the IAEA, said exactly the opposite:

I have seen the Iranians ready to accept putting a cap on their enrichment [program] in terms of tens of centrifuges, and then in terms of hundreds of centrifuges. But nobody even tried to engage them on these offers. Now Iran has 5,000 centrifuges. The line was, "Iran will buckle under pressure." But this issue has become so ingrained in the Iranian soul as a matter of national pride.

Interview with Salehi on Iran's nuclear program

With the appointment of Ali Akbar Salehi as the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, I thought it would be a good idea to review and excerpt of an interview he did for the Financial Times in 2004, which explains many of the issues in the US-Iran standoff.

[In the interview, Salehi said that during a meeting held at Columbia University and chaired by Dr Gary Sick, a former State Department official stated that No matter how many times Iran signs the additional protocol, we will keep up our pressure until Iran yields to a political détente.’ I just wanted to point out that Gary Sick as confirmed this as being true.] 

Iran's nuclear program is peaceful

Financial Times, September 9 2004
by GARETH SMYTH

FT: What is the role of the IAEA in monitoring nuclear programmes – is it simply monitoring the NPT?

Salehi: According to its constitution, the IAEA has three roles. One is to monitor the non-diversion of peaceful activities towards non-peaceful activities by any member state – that is the ‘safeguards’ part of the IAEA.

The second one is to help member countries develop their own nuclear technology, compatible with their needs, capacity and infrastructure.

The third aspect is safety. The IAEA makes sure that member states using nuclear technology do so safely. This is important, because the safety of nuclear power plants, for example, is not limited to the country where they are located.

These are the essential missions of the IAEA, and in my experience of five years at the IAEA, it has been objective and meticulous in carrying out these missions. It has not yielded or submitted to much political influence.

FT: One of the criticisms made of the NPT is that under its terms, states can get very near to the technology required to make nuclear weapons while developing a civilian programme and then, legitimately, can say they are leaving NPT and will make weapons. Is that a legitimate criticism?

Salehi: It is not legitimate in the sense that we can measure the intentions of member countries – we have no device for that.

Yes, if you acquire technology to some extent then you are potentially a country that can divert this technology to non-peaceful purposes. For example, Germany, Japan, Canada – these are the major developed countries with full fuel-cycles who are utilising nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and are under all sorts of inspection.

FT: Germany and Canada have more advanced nuclear technology than Pakistan...

Salehi: Of course. All these developments have come from Germany...Even Belgium, Holland and Sweden have mastered the technology and if they wish to divert, they can. But does this mean all these countries should be limited, their progress stopped, because of the fear that one day they may develop something fearful?

Probably there are two ways to measure intention. One is to look at the past behaviour – how can you categorise the intention of the US in using nuclear technology? The US has used this technology in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so the US is not in a position to tell others they cannot be trusted.

The other way is to create international instruments to prevent member countries overstretching limits – such as the NPT, such as the additional protocol....

In both these matters, Iran has been successful. We were attacked by chemical weapons from Iraq [during the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war], although it was denied for many years. Despite its capacity to react, Iran didn’t do so but behaved in a responsible manner. During the war, we gave 24-hour warnings for people to leave Iraqi cities, and we are proud of this.

In the relation to the second, we are a signatory of the NPT and we have acceded to the additional protocol. We are signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention of the Convention for the Test Ban Treaty, which bans nuclear explosions. We are hosting CTBT monitoring stations in Iran – five monitoring stations in Iran in the future, and we have two of them already working, monitoring the region.

FT: There is an argument that Iran should have nuclear weapons, like at least one of your immediate neighbours [Pakistan].

Salehi: In matters of national security we are not timid. We will assert our intentions. If nuclear weapons would have brought security, we would have announced to the world that we would go after them. We have shown we are an independent country, not a lackey of a superpower. We will decide what is appropriate for our national security.

But we have come to the conclusion that nuclear weapons would not bring us security. We think nuclear weapons for Iran would invite more threats, and trigger competition for nuclear weapons.

FT: That wasn’t the judgement of Saddam, who bombed Bushehr [an Iranian reactor] in 1985. Nor of Israel, nor of America, all of whom seem to feel nuclear arms would make Iran stronger…

Salehi: We do not think a nuclear Iran would be stronger. The leader of the country [Ayatollah Ali Khamanei] has issued an edict saying having a nuclear weapon is not allowed – this is a government principle. We have come to the conclusion that the best security for Iran is to have the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. If we have weapons of mass destruction we are not going to use them – we cannot. We did not use chemical weapons against Iraq.

Secondly, we do not feel any real threat from our neighbours. Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, we have no particular problems with them, nor with Afghanistan. The only powerful country is Russia in the north, and no matter how many nuclear weapons we had we could not match Russia.

Israel, our next neighbour, we do not consider an entity by itself but as part of the US. Facing Israel means facing the US. We cannot match the US.

We do not have strategic differences with our neighbours, including Turkey.

FT: You were at the apparently successful meeting that reached agreement with the Europeans last October - an agreement that the Europeans interpreted to mean that Iran would give up control of the nuclear enrichment cycle. The Iranian side says it will not give up control of the cycle. How can this divergence have happened?

Salehi: Mr [Hassan] Rowhani [head of Iran’s Supreme Council of National Security] in the meeting, in front of the three ministers [the foreign ministers of Britain, Germany and France], stressed over and over again that the voluntary suspension, and not cessation, [of uranium enrichment] could last from a day to a year. This was very clear to the three ministers.

We have told the Europeans – and we are telling them now – that we are wise enough not to expect you to think like us. We are ready to give any kind of meaningful guarantees and assurances that Iran will never divert its fuel-cycle technology to non-peaceful use.

We have even once indicated – not officially – that we are ready to enter into a joint venture in the enrichment of uranium. [We have said to the Europeans] ‘Bring your expertise to Natanz, join us, and sell to us, and to others.’

Iran has 10 per cent of Eurodif [the European consortium], which has a European enrichment plant [in France] ... It sells enrichment services to the world, and Iran has a 10 per cent share dating from the time of the past regime.

Why not repeat this same thing here, and we will assure you we will buy all the production. Natanz has been designed to produce 30 tons of enriched uranium up to 5 per cent maximum [ - below the level required for a nuclear bomb], and that is only enough for one year’s refuelling. Nantaz, with all its vastness, can supply only one reactor for a year. We are to construct seven reactors, we are starting the bid for the twin reactor in Bushehr in a year’s time, so for that one we need to buy our uranium from outside.

But this is a bargaining chip for us....We have made an economic calculation that with the facilities we have developed, the fuel we are going to fabricate in Iran would be a lot cheaper that what we can buy internationally. The manpower here is much cheaper and the capital investment we’ve made is in rials not in dollars.

FT: When you say bargaining chip, do you mean Iran might compromise over this?

Salehi: We say that for other plants we are going to buy our fuel from outside, but we are not going to become hostage to their wishes. Once they know we can develop our own enrichment, then they will enter into bargaining with us – like any other country.

FT: Is the control over the fuel cycle a matter of national sovereignty?

Salehi:Nuclear technology, of you are able to master it, opens the way to other technologies, because you are dealing with the highest limits of engineering – the highest pressures, highest temperatures, the highest material properties. This know-how can be used in other industries.

With technology you cannot have big jumps. You can’t suddenly expect an underdeveloped country to send a rocket to the moon.

Nuclear technology would give us the base for future technology in fusion, which is the ultimate answer to unlimited supply of energy for human beings. If you do not master fission now, when fusion comes in 20 to 30 years you will be totally ignorant.

FT: So when the Europeans say they want an international supply of enriched uranium….

Salehi: The Europeans have said they would assure us of the supply of nuclear fuel for the lifetime of the power plants, which run for 60 years, which is almost three generations. Who can believe such a guarantee? The world may change, we don’t know what will happen, even the European Union may break up in three generations …

FT: You said that to them?

Salehi: Yes.

FT: How did they react?

Salehi: Nothing. No answer.

FT: If Iran is supplied with enriched uranium, which is then removed after use, how would you as a physicist feel? Is this an insult?

Salehi: Of course we take this as an insult. This coming board of governors [of IAEA, on September 13] will be the seventh that will tackle the issue of Iran. This last report has been the most mild and positive compared to past ones. When they were less lenient, the Americans and the Europeans could not make the board of governors react in a very radical manner, because the board understood that Iran had not really gone beyond its obligations under the treaty [NPT]. It had made some small mistakes in reporting, not in a timely manner …

FT: It had hidden things?

Salehi: No, no, not like South Korea [which recently admitted a secret nuclear programme]. If the board of governors of the IAEA had concluded that Iran was in breach of its obligations, it would not have waited a second to refer Iran to the security council.

There are matters of difference. We had not reported some natural uranium. When it came to the question of why, there was a difference of interpretation of two articles of the safeguards agreement between us and the IAEA: if you read one article, you would feel that you do not have to report it, in another article you would feel you do. The catch was the one effective kilogram of uranium: if it was imported, you would have to report it, but if it was developed inside, you wouldn’t have to.

Things of this sort have created a lot of fuss. Take polonium. They said we didn’t report it. We said, look, you have the log-book of the reactor, the Tehran reactor, which your inspectors visit every month. The log-book had the signature of the inspector and he had not noticed it [the polonium]. This is not our problem.

Look at South Korea. It has a hidden enrichment activity, and we are waiting to see how the world is going to react.

Through the force of the media, they made the public believe that our activity in Natanz was a secret activity. Can you imagine? Had it been secret, would the IAEA have waited a second to refer us to the security council?

There was no secret activity in Natanz. How can it be secret if it has a few hundred acres, and a sign saying ‘Atomic Energy Organisation’ and the buses that go from Tehran to Natanz stop at a station called ‘Atomic station’?

Yes, we didn’t tell it to the IAEA, but we didn’t have to. Under the safeguards agreement, we have to tell the IAEA only 180 days before we enter the nuclear material into the facility. It is not yet completed and we have not brought in any nuclear material.

Look at our intention about the UCF, uranium conversion facility, in Isfahan. This converts natural uranium, which is called yellowcake, into hexoflouride uranium, UF6. What can you do with UF6? Its only use is in an enrichment facility. Five years ago, before the construction of the facilities, we invited Mr ElBaradei [IAEA chief] to Iran, took him to Isfahan, showed him the barren land said and said this was where we want to construct our uranium conversion facility. We were not obliged to do so – we could have constructed the facility and were obliged to inform the IAEA only before inputting the nuclear fuel.

In other words, when we indicated to the IAEA we would construct a UCF, we implied we were going to have an enrichment facility.

In the year 2000, I was invited to Columbia university by Mr Gary Sick for a review conference on the NPT. I gave a talk about our nuclear activities. A Japanese representative proposed that Iran sign the additional protocol – and this was before the issue of Iran popped up, everything was calm. Before I had the opportunity to answer, an American gentlemen, a retired state department employee who specialised in disarmament, said, and this was exactly the phrase he used: ‘No matter how many times Iran signs the additional protocol, we will keep up our pressure until Iran yields to a political détente. If this is realised, then we will offer them two of our best reactors.’

The US knows Iran is a responsible country, they know our intentions very well. The issue of détente is in the hands of the political elites of the two countries. It’s not an issue of Iran having a nuclear weapon.

Instead of using their energies to find ways and means of approaching each other, they are both exhausting their energy in weakening each other. For the US, it’s time to understand that the golden key to the region is Iran and without Iran the Middle East issue cannot be resolved in its entirety.

Economically we are self-sufficient. There are countries around us that look developed but owe $140bn in debt. That makes them susceptible to many problems.

We have $30bn in reserves, the highest in Iran’s history, and $9bn of debt, which is nothing for a country like Iran. Iran will take off very soon, and there is no way to stop Iran from progressing. The US and the West should understand this, and eventually they will treat Iran as an equal partner and a country that is fully independent.

FT: Do you see the IAEA as a neutral body, like a referee?

Salehi: Yes. I have come to the conclusion, from the way the IAEA tackled the issue of Iraq and did not yield to the pressure of the US over the Niger scandal, and from the way it is tackling the issue of Iran, that the IAEA has come to understand that it is more important to save the prestige and the integrity of the IAEA than to yield to the pressure of this or that country.

The IAEA is loudly saying that it has found no indications that Iran has diverted its peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It has done a relatively good job, and I myself am grateful to the IAEA and its board of governors.
The Financial Times

Iran metro funding scheme "laudable": MEED

The Middle East Economic Digest has an interesting article on how Tehran is financing the billions of dollars required to finish the Tehran subway system despite the sanctions:

Viewed in this light, the ingenuity being shown to attract local private-sector investment to the expansion of Tehran metro is laudable.

A pilot scheme launched early this year to ease the financial burden on the project has proved successful enough to be rolled out across the city. Under the scheme, land is bought by the government and sold to contractors at discounted prices.

Those companies can develop the land as they please, provided they incorporate a metro station into the work and agree to share profits from their commercial project on a short-term basis.

Skepticism about democracy promotion in Iran and the Middle East

According to Gallup public opinion polls, Iranians and Middle Easterners in general are quite skeptical about U.S. commitment to democracy in the region, whether under Bush or Obama:

Gallup says:

Obama administration reacted Monday to the final declaration of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the winner of Iran's disputed election with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton simply saying, "these internal matters are for Iranians themselves to address." Such a stance may be welcomed by Iranians, 75% of whom in 2008 disagreed with the statement, "The U.S. will allow people in this region to fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S. influence...

In 2008, even as the Bush administration continued its vocal support of some democratic movements and opposition activists throughout the Middle East, 80% of Iranians disagreed that the U.S. was serious about encouraging democracy in the region.

Other 2008 Gallup Polls in the region also revealed widespread skepticism. For example, when Gallup asked Egyptians, Lebanese, and Saudis about their opinion on the same statement in May 2008, 76%, 74%, and 72%, respectively, disagreed.

In 2008, Gallup also asked Iranians an open-ended question about what the U.S. should do to improve relations with the Muslim world. After "not to mock anything related to religion," which 20% of respondents mentioned, "stop its pride and arrogance" (15%) and "stop its interference in internal affairs of Muslim countries" (11%) were among the most frequently mentioned actions.

"Torture" and the NY Times

Glenn Greenwald on the NY Times' use of the word torture when applied to Iran versus the US:

"Torture" appears to be a perfectly fine term for The New York Times to use to describe what the Iranians do, but one that is explicitly banned to describe what the U.S. did...

It's not particularly unusual for a government to permit itself to do something that it prohibits others from doing.  The U.S. is hardly the only country that does that.  But when that country's media collectively abets that government effort by molding its language to reflect that exceptionalism, it elevates the propaganda to a much different level.  

(The point of this post is to expose media hypocricy, not to say that torture in Iran is fine since the US does the same thing. It is not.)

What the unrest in Iran is really all about

Alaister Crooke pretty much sums up my views of how the recent events in Iran were misread (deliberately in many cases) abroad:

What we are witnessing is not a frustrated East European-style "color revolution"; nor is presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi's movement an uprising of liberal, Westernized sympathizers against the principles of the Iranian Revolution

It was Ahmadinejad who campaigned against the wealth and self-interest of some of the clerical elite. Mousavi was more closely allied to those interests.

Between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad, I have to wonder who is really the "reformer".

Some exile groups saw an opportunity here to try to ride Mousavi's back, since they lack much popularity or legitimacy of their own. These were quick to say that the matter really isn't about Mousavi anymore, and tried to turn events into an attack on the regime itself (which fizzled out because of lack of popular support.) Also, some groups opposed to an improvement in US-Iran relations also saw an opportunity to try to undermine Obama's opening to Iran (such as it was) claiming that the regime in Iran now lacks sufficient credibility and legitimacy to be negotiated with.

Israel Project Propaganda Handbook exposed

Newsweek has published The Israel Project's 2009 Global Language Dictionary which makes for very fun reading because it purports to be a manual on how to "communicate effectively in support of Israel." (In case you're curious what The Israel Project is, remember this.)

Chapter 5 (starting on p. 38) on Iran's nuclear program is particularly entertaining, especially the part about how pro-Israeli advocates should try to portray Iran's nuclear program as a "global threat" and especially to Arab countries, rather than just an Israeli concern, and how you should advocate for sanctions "economic diplomacy" -- but only as part of a "step-by-step" approach to military confrontation.

The manual warns in several places about using excessive hype that makes the pro-Israeli claims unbelievable. I guess the Israel Project has learned from its past mistakes in making over-the-top claims (like about how Iran wants to nuke Denver) and is now instead toning down the hype so as to sound more believable.

Clock ticking on Iranian nukes... Or is it?

So one day Yukiya Amano, the new head of the International Atomic Energy Organization, states plainly that he has not seen any evidence that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and the very next day Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Chief of Staff declares that time is running out on trying to prevent Iran from acquiring nukes and Biden gives Israel the green light to bomb Iran (yes I know Obama later denied giving Israel a green light -- but that's  just CYA and "plausible deniability" at work.)

Amano:

The incoming head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Friday he did not see any hard evidence Iran was trying to gain the ability to develop nuclear arms.

"I don't see any evidence in IAEA official documents about this," Yukiya Amano told Reuters in his first direct comment on Iran's atomic program since his election, when asked whether he believed Tehran was seeking nuclear weapons capability."

Mullen:

The top U.S. military officer warned on Tuesday that time is running out for dialogue with Tehran to avoid either a nuclear-armed Iran or a possible military strike against the Islamic Republic.

Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it is critical for diplomatic efforts to reach a solution before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or faces an Israeli or U.S. strike to turn back its nuclear program.

Incidentally, note how Mullen frames this as a false choice: the only choices are to prevent Iran's nuclear program from progressing (whether by sanctions, "dialogue" or Israeli attack) or else Iran will obtain nuclear weapons. I have written about this way misframing the issue previously:

Basically, in presenting the matter as "either prevent Iran's enrichment or else Iran will obtain nuclear weapons", they're  conveniently limiting the range of choices and leaving out a significant option: accepting Iran's compromise proposals that would address any real concern that Iran's nuclear program could be used to make bombs.

But I suppose the real irony is how Biden claims that Israel has a "sovereign right" to attack Iran, whereas Iran supposedly doesn't have a sovereign right to have its own civilian, IAEA-monitored nuclear program. Since when? In fact, using force to resolve disputes is contrary to the UN Charter and constitutes a crime under international law. Israel has no such "sovereign right" and automatically labelling Israeli aggression as "pre-emptive" doesn't give it such a right either. In fact, such an attack would not meet the definition of "pre-emptive" since Israel faces no threat of attack from Iran which is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Rather, at best such an attack could be described as preventive -- and therefore illegal.

Addendum: Meanwhile, pro-Israeli lobbyists are pressing for a US-Iran confrontation.