I've been participating in an online debate over at the Gulf2000 Project over Iran's nuclear program -- no surprise there -- with the usual accusations flung against me of being an "apologist" for the Iranian government, etc. It is interesting as a case study of argumentation and narration in in international affairs.
The Argument:
The debate is over whether Iran is seeking a "breakout capacity" as it is often claimed. Here, the "break-out capacity" theory is put forth as an argument for two possible scanarios that Iran is supposedly following: first, that Iran currently secretly intends or plans to make a nuclear weapon with the enriched uranium it is accumulating. Or, second, that Iran seeks to keep open the option of building nukes in the future even if has not decided to do so currently (and merely keeping the option open is itself treated as a form of being nuclear-armed - "virtually" - since theoretically there isn't much difference between having nukes and the "capability" of having nukes - or so the argument claims.) These are both essentially variations of the same argument.
So, if we buy this argument that Iran seeks breakout capacity, then we can proceed on questions of whether Iran seeks this breakout capacity as merely a deterrent or for aggressive purposes, and whether the the Iranians are "rational" etc. And a lot of people are buying the argument without thinking, as evidenced for example by all the op-eds from the anti-Neocons who argue that Iran is merely seeking nuclear weapons as a deterrent, thus implicitly taking it for granted that Iran is in fact seeking nuclear weapons in the first place.
As an argument, we're trying to convince each other of the liklihood of these scenarios happening, by engaging in a debate using the rules of inference and logic, relying on evidence and rhetoric. As with most arguments, there is no provable "right" answer since no one can see into the future nor guess at the supposedly hidden intentions of the Iranian, and no amount of IAEA inspections can prove or disprove things either way since the IAEA can't see into the future either. This is particularly convenient for Iran's accusers, because by framing the argument as one of Iran's future intentions and capabilities, they can conflate Iran's legal and overt nuclear enrichment program with "building nukes". Note how everytime the IAEA reports come out verifying that IRan's enrichment program is continuing under safeguards, the media rush over to David Albright of ISIS whose function seems to be to give "expert" crebility to the breakout scenario argument by calculating how many pounds of of Iran's low-enriched uranium can theoretically be turned into weapons-grade Uranium and how fast. The media then claim that turning the weapons grade uranium into an actual bomb can be done in a matter of months, and like magic, supposition is built on supposition to conclude that Iran is "on the path to the capability of making nukes" which then is dumbed down in screaming headlines to "Iran is just months from the bomb" and so naturally it "must be stopped". In short, this is classic application of the prolepsis device to the argument - "a figurative device by which a future event is presumed to have already occurred" - thus entirely skipping over the question of whether Iran is seeking breakout capacity or not.
I keep pointing out in this debate that simply assuming that Iran seeks breakout capacity ignores contrary evidence -- for example, the fact Iran's many nuclear compromise offers would make it impossible (to any practical extent possible, short of giving up enrichment) for Iran to build nukes, and that Iranian assertions that nuclear weapons would not help them as a deterrent objectively make sense. In short, I argue that the other side is committing a fallacy by simply taking Iran's desire for breakout capacity for granted and demanding that Iran disprove the assumption, thus violating the basic rules of argumentation.
The other side responds that the Iranian offers are treated as lies, and I am personally attacked as an "apologist" for the Iranian regime for refusing to go along with the 'conventional wisdom' created by the constant, repetitious media hype. This of course is the old ad hominem tactic. It is a predictable reaction to messengers of inconvenient facts in any argument, and people (like me, again) who doubted the claims about WMDs in Iraq were given the same treatment back then too.
And so the argument goes on and on.
So the debate we're having is at its lowest level an argument about the degree to which we take for granted that Iran is seeking a breakout capacity. But at the same time, there's a bigger picture.
The Narrative Context
The same issue can be seen as a classic contest of narratives. Narratives are basically stories and usually it have a start, middle, and end. They have protagonists, antagonists, and agon (a conflict between them) as well as a narrator (speaker who tells the story, and so imparts his own reliability or point-of-view to it.) A good story delivers a satisfying closure, but only after a bit of suspense. And a satisfying closure is usually that which normalizes the narrative so it corresponds to metanarratives that are culturally ingrained.
The car ad which shows how a young man who decides to drive a particular car ends up with the pretty girl, is a narrative. So is the story of how Moses led the Jews out of Israel. Science consists of narratives: first came the fishes, then the reptiles, then monkey and now man. Politics is also full of stories -- the best example is the national foundation myth: for example how America was founded by Puritans who came to these shores in search of religious freedom, and so we conclude that freedom was a foundational value of America.
So cut things short, the conflict over Iran's nuclear program can be seen as a case of conflicting narrative:
The US narrative is that of an evil country led by a crazy leader who seeks to bring about Armageddon through a nuclear holocaust, and so it is up to the Good to stand up to Evil and save humanity. How many times have you heard that plot line before? Often -- it is a classic metanarrative, after all, found in most Hollywood movies.
The Iranian narrative is one of small, weak country seeking to assert itself in the face of aggression and bullying by foreign powers who seek to deprive the country of her natural rights and keep her down. Again, a common enough narrative (see the narrative of the American Revolution.)
So the question is, which narrative wins, and how. I'm not going to get into that in detail since this isn't my area of expertise, I don't have time, and it requires more boring typing. But in short, my point is arguments occur in the context of narratives, and so the narrative context makes some arguments more convincing. The Iranians have to fundamentally change the narrative and IN THE US MEDIA (not just presstv.) By simply participating in the argument by denying the allegations against them (an argument which Iran can never "win") they are ignoring the bigger narrative conflict. Its no use to simply deny the allegations when the US has shiften the burden of proof onto Iran, since that requires Iran to disprove a negative which is impossible. Instead of trying to do so fruitlessly, Iran has to fundamentally change the narrative context, and THEN it can win the argument.
Recent Comments